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Abstract
This essay explores the impact of Søren Kierkegaard upon the important Italian 
Thomist, Cornelio Fabro. Fabro rejected the caricature of Kierkegaard as an 
“irrationalist” and placed him firmly in the Christian tradition. By highlighting the 
influence of Kierkegaard upon a Thomist like Fabro, the relevance of Fabro’s own 
thought is opened up for more contemporary debates in theology regarding the 
enduring legacies of German idealism, existentialism, and atheism.
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What is the relationship between Thomism and (what is typically portrayed as) a radical subjectivist view of faith? Normally, these two worldviews are pre-sented as mutually exclusive. Yet this need not be the case. In this article, I 
will introduce briefly the impact of Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855) upon the Italian 
Thomist, Cornelio Fabro (1911–1995). I present Fabro’s interpretation of Kierkegaard’s 
writings to elaborate upon how a Thomist might engage Kierkegaard’s writings in a 
critical and constructive manner. Although Fabro is not well known in the English-
speaking world, I intend to make the range of Fabro’s thought more accessible. 
Corresponding author:
Joshua Furnal, Faculty of Philosophy, Theology, and Religious Studies, Radboud University, Nijmegen, 
Erasmusplein 1, Nijmegen, 6525 HT, Netherlands. 
Email: j.furnal@ftr.ru.nl
714618 TSJ0010.1177/0040563917714618Theological StudiesFurnal
research-article2017
Article
The Dialectic of Faith and Reason in Cornelio Fabro’s Reading of Kierkegaard’s Theology 719
 1. Helen James John, The Thomist Spectrum (New York: Fordham University, 1966).
 2. John F. X. Knasas, Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists (New York: Fordham 
University, 2003).
 3. Søren Kierkegaard, Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age; A Literary 
Review, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University, 
1978), 70–96.
 4. Cornelio Fabro, La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo San Tommaso D’aquino 
(Roma: EDIVI, 2005).
Moreover, I argue that Kierkegaard should not be read as an irrationalist standing out-
side of the Christian tradition, but rather, with Fabro’s hands, Kierkegaard is  brought 
into the mainstream of the long Western tradition of theological reflection upon the 
relation between faith and reason. According to Fabro, Kierkegaard is an important 
Christian thinker who appreciates the form and authority of the act of faith—especially 
as it is ordered toward the truth. Some contemporary Thomists and Kierkegaard schol-
ars might disapprove of Fabro’s interpretation, but my aim is to invite these two groups 
to an intersection that does not often receive proper treatment or discussion.
Often in scholarly accounts of the history of Thomism in the twentieth century, 
there are (at least) two dominant schools of thought presented.1 The “Neo-Scholastic” 
or “Strict-Observance” Thomists are often contrasted against Thomists influenced by 
Kantian or existentialist thought.2 The “Neo-Scholastic” Thomists are often known for 
condemning theological propositions that are not explicitly endorsed in the writings of 
Thomas Aquinas, whose thought they have distilled into twenty-four theses. The 
“Transcendental” and “Existential” Thomists are often known for grafting the theo-
logical propositions of Thomas on to a post-Cartesian or post-Kantian philosophical 
project. Both approaches are generally characterized as attempts to build a theological 
system of thought using Scholastic and modern sources.
Kierkegaard is well known for his stance against totalitarian thought and the way it 
manifests in society by “leveling” the individual off into a more generic “crowd.”3 In 
his writings, Kierkegaard’s anti-totalitarian stance often targets the “system” of 
Hegel’s philosophy (and the Danish Hegelians who read Hegel). Given these stereo-
typical portrayals of Thomism and Kierkegaard in contemporary scholarship, should 
one expect an impasse between Thomists and Kierkegaard scholars on the basis of 
endorsing or rejecting attempts at intellectual system building? Perhaps this is one 
reason why Fabro’s engagement with Kierkegaard’s writings is important to recover, 
because Fabro’s nuanced approach does not map on to these stereotypes.
It is well established that Fabro made a decisive contribution to Thomist metaphys-
ics with his recovery of the notion of participation in the works of Thomas Aquinas.4 
This is a very important strand in Fabro’s thought, but Thomas is not the only thinker 
that had a major influence on Fabro. In fact, I argue that Fabro viewed the writings of 
Kierkegaard and Thomas in a complementary way that was fruitful for his own intel-
lectual development. Indeed, Fabro himself said that
My encounter with Kierkegaard has been no less decisive than that of St. Thomas. Just as the 
metaphysics of Thomas forever liberated me from the formalism and emptiness of scholastic 
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controversies, so Kierkegaard’s Christian existentialism liberated me from an inferiority 
complex toward thought, or more precisely, toward the pandemonium of systems 
continuously churned out by modern and contemporary philosophy [helping me to identify] 
the anti-human background to their anti-Christian stance.5
Since there have been several recent articles and books written in English that 
engage the topic of Fabro’s contribution to Thomistic metaphysics,6 I want to specify 
instead the ways in which Kierkegaard impacted Fabro’s thinking. So the central ques-
tion that I would like to explore is this: How does Fabro take a controversial thinker 
like Kierkegaard and interpret his writings in a complementary and fruitful way? To 
answer this question, one could examine the vast number of Fabro’s articles and trans-
lations of Kierkegaard. However, since space is limited, I will focus only on Fabro’s 
classic essay, “Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Dialectic.”7
In the first part of this article, I will introduce Fabro briefly for those readers that 
are unfamiliar with his work. In part two, I will present Fabro’s account of Kierkegaard’s 
theology of faith to show how Fabro appropriates it in a pre-conciliar setting—espe-
cially Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon the existential situation, truth, and authority of 
faith. Although Fabro originally wrote his famous Kierkegaard essay before the 
Second Vatican Council, it illuminates his reading of Kierkegaard’s theology of faith 
after the Leonine Revival of Thomas Aquinas. In the third and final part of this article, 
I will highlight Fabro’s account of the dialectical relationship of faith and reason in 
Kierkegaard’s writings that Fabro connects to the broader catholicity of the Christian 
tradition. Indeed, it was Fabro himself who claimed that “the relation between reason 
and faith is the center of the work of Kierkegaard and his position in substance attains 
the formula which leads from Hugh of St. Victor to St. Thomas.”8 More will be said 
about Fabro’s observation here, but the upshot of revisiting Fabro’s important essay on 
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Kierkegaard is to better understand why a Thomist like Fabro gravitated toward 
Kierkegaard in the first place. Yet it also indicates that the English reception of Fabro’s 
thought should not be limited to the history of Neo-Thomism and its varieties. By 
highlighting the influence of Kierkegaard upon a Thomist like Fabro, the relevance of 
Fabro’s own thought is opened up for more contemporary debates in theology regard-
ing the enduring legacies of German idealism, existentialism, and atheism.
A Brief Introduction to Cornelio Fabro
Cornelio Fabro (1911–1995) was born in Udine and he died in Rome. One of the most 
authoritative interpreters of Aquinas in the twentieth century, he was also a priest of 
the Stigmatine Order.9 Although Fabro is virtually unknown in the English-speaking 
world,10 Fabro’s critique of what he called “the principle of immanence,” his involve-
ment as an expert during the Second Vatican Council,11 his highly influential contribu-
tions to recovering the notion of participation in the metaphysics of Aquinas,12 and his 
translations of Kierkegaard’s writings, all point to the fact that the relevance of Fabro’s 
writings endure despite the fact that they are not yet properly appreciated in wider 
debates. One key aspect that is often neglected is how Fabro engaged fully with other 
philosophical schools of thought like German idealism, existentialism, and atheism—
evidenced by his numerous books and articles engaging the writings of continental 
philosophers like Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, Fichte, and Feuerbach. For Fabro, the 
bridge between the worlds of Thomism and continental philosophy was found in the 
writings of Kierkegaard. On the face of it, this seems counterintuitive; but one might 
ask how did Fabro come around to adopt this approach?
After earning his first doctorate in philosophy from the Pontifical Lateran University 
in 1931 with a thesis on David Hume and the principle of causality, Fabro studied zool-
ogy, biology, and psychology in Italy until 1938. In 1937, Fabro received his second 
doctorate in theology from the Angelicum for his groundbreaking work entitled, La 
nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo San Tommaso d’Aquino, subsequently 
published in 1939. Fabro then went on to teach biology and psychology at Urbaniana 
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University in Rome. During this fruitful period, Fabro focused on the role of perception 
in empirical analysis, publishing La fenomenologia della percezione (1941) and 
Percezione e pensiero (1941). It was around 1940 that Fabro first encountered existen-
tialism, particularly the writings of Kierkegaard—an author that would lead Fabro to 
learn Danish and spend the rest of his life translating him into Italian.
In 1947, Fabro became the dean of the Urbaniana, and in 1948 taught theoretical 
philosophy at the University of Rome. In 1954, he gave the Cardinal Mercier lec-
tures in Louvain, which were subsequently published as Participation et causalité.13 
As a result, Fabro received a gold medallion from the Philosophical Society of 
Louvain. From 1957 to 1958, he worked as a professor at the Catholic University of 
Milan and he was appointed as a consultant to the Congregation for the Doctrine 
of the Faith. In 1959, he established the Institute for the Study of Atheism at the 
Urbaniana (the first of its kind in Europe).14 In 1960, he became a member of the 
preparatory commission and peritus during the Second Vatican Council. In 1964, he 
was given a gold medallion by the President of Italy for his contributions in educa-
tion, culture, and the arts.
In 1965, Fabro toured the UK and USA giving lectures on atheism and contempo-
rary philosophy at St. Olaf’s College (home of the Hong Kierkegaard Library) and at 
the University of St. Thomas (Houston). He was also a visiting professor at the 
University of Notre Dame. In this same year, Fabro served as the Italian representative 
at the UNESCO conference in Oxford for the revision of the Declaration of Human 
Rights. From 1965 to 1981, he taught at the University of Perugia, first as professor of 
philosophy and head of the teaching faculty, then as professor of theoretical philoso-
phy in the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy. During this period, Fabro was appointed as 
a consultant to the Congregation for Catholic Education and to the Secretariat for Non-
Believers. In 1974, he received the Aquinas Medal from the American Catholic 
Philosophical Association. In total, he was a member of over ten academies, including 
the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Pontifical Academy of Theology 
(Rome), the Academy of the Italian Philosophical Society, the Kierkegaard Selskabet 
in Copenhagen, the Academy of Société philosophique de Louvain, and Søren 
Kierkegaard Research Centre at the University of Osaka (Japan).
Broadly speaking, Fabro’s intellectual itinerary can be divided into four parts:
•• Fabro’s early Thomist phase regarding the metaphysics of participation 
(1935–1941);
•• Fabro’s engagement with phenomenology, atheism, German idealism, and exis-
tentialism (1941–1969; 1983);
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•• Fabro’s later Thomist phase (1960–1961; 1969; 1983), and his polemic with 
Karl Rahner (1974–79);
•• Fabro’s various spiritual writings on freedom (1980–1995).
As one can begin to see, Fabro wrote during a time when the emergence of existen-
tialist thought in Italy continued despite Pope Pius X’s previous condemnation of 
Modernism in Pascendi Dominici Gregis (1907). Yet, Fabro sought to uphold the fun-
damental principles of Thomism and still engage the pressing issues of modernity in 
dialogue with wider European thought. This conviction led Fabro to write many books 
and articles about the shared concerns of philosophical and theological thought in the 
twentieth century. Fabro’s central, yet prescient contribution was to provide a new 
model of religious understanding that accounts for how an immanent view of reality 
participates in transcendence.
Fabro on Kierkegaard’s Theology of Faith
In 1957, Cornelio Fabro published the proceedings of a symposium on Kierkegaard 
that he organized two years earlier that celebrated the centenary of Kierkegaard’s 
death.15 Among the staggering number of publications in that year, Fabro also pub-
lished a compendium of essays entitled Dall’essere all’esistente, which included an 
essay entitled “Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard’s Dialectic” that was later translated 
into English. In the early twentieth century, most of the exegetical work done by 
Kierkegaard scholars overlooked or refused to appreciate what Fabro called the “theo-
logical and philosophical consistency that Kierkegaard accords to faith.”16 If scholars 
tended to mention faith in relation to Kierkegaard, it was only to focus upon a flight 
from reason. Fabro observes that this misconception is often motivated by Kierkegaard’s 
claim that “truth is subjectivity.”17 So scholars would then equate Kierkegaard with 
Karl Barth’s rejection of natural theology. To resist this trend, Fabro places Kierkegaard 
on an intellectual spectrum between Friedrich Nietzsche and John Henry Newman, 
describing Kierkegaard’s writings as “the most remarkable among the religious works 
of the [nineteenth] century.”18 But Fabro is quick to indicate that Kierkegaard’s dialec-
tical relation between faith and reason actually distances him from Barth’s negative 
portrayal. As a consequence, Fabro says that current scholarship fails to appreciate 
Kierkegaard’s constructive project by emphasizing all too often this misconception. 
Although Kierkegaard himself may continue to evade classification as Catholic or 
Protestant, what is important for Fabro is the way in which
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Kierkegaard repeats one thousand times that he does not intend to establish a new school of 
thought or to make a system, but only wants to be the voice of a reawakening that shakes up 
a lazy, misguided and sleepy Christianity … and the problem of faith that it presents 
constitutes in its essential moment a return to the authentic Christian position and, if you 
wish, even to the Catholic and Thomist position, at least on certain points.19
Now, this may seem just as counterintuitive today as it did in Fabro’s era. However, 
Fabro insists that what seems counterintuitive about his claim only reflects the endur-
ing uncritical acceptance of preconceptions that pervaded the Kierkegaard Renaissance 
during the early twentieth century, which became the normative interpretation of 
Kierkegaard’s writings.20 In the next section, I will emphasize the way in which Fabro 
sought to correct these preconceptions, by rehabilitating the theological underpinnings 
of Kierkegaard’s notion of “truth as subjectivity.”
The Existential Situation of Faith
The first aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought that Fabro appreciates is the way in which 
Kierkegaard emphasized the importance of human subjectivity for faith. During this 
time period, one of the central insights from Kierkegaard that held Fabro’s attention 
was how the problem of faith and the problem of existence were inseparable. 
Kierkegaard argues, “in order to have faith, there must first be existence, an existential 
qualification.”21 Famously, Kierkegaard addresses the role of human subjectivity for 
the truth of Christianity in part two of his pseudonymous Postscript (1846). In reading 
the Postscript, scholars tend to interpret the subjectivity or the “how” of faith (part 
two) as mutually exclusive to the objectivity or the “what” of faith (part one). Yet, 
Fabro argues that Kierkegaard himself never explicitly endorses this interpretation. In 
fact, Fabro points to an often neglected passage in Kierkegaard’s Journals where he 
says that “when the How is scrupulously rendered, the What is also given; and this is 
the How of ‘faith.’”22 Fabro says that when Kierkegaard speaks of the “how” of faith, 
the subjectivity he portrays is not in a “phenomenological, empiricist, or transcenden-
tal sense” or merely as the creativity and self-reflection of the subject. Instead, subjec-
tivity is presented as the subjectivity of existing—which Fabro describes as “the 
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resolution or decision of freedom to break the circle of immanence by the assent to 
transcendental Truth, accompanied by the proposal to conform oneself to it in the life 
of time.”23
Fabro notes that in Philosophical Fragments (1844), Kierkegaard comments on 
Enlightenment thinker Gotthold Lessing’s problem with deriving an eternal happiness 
from a historical perspective. He indicates here a convergence between Thomas and 
Kierkegaard regarding the object of faith. Fabro asks, “How can someone consider as 
true that which cannot be understood? And how can one retain as absolute and divine 
truth precisely that which finds itself in the most acute contrast to the evidence of rea-
son?”24 Lessing’s conclusion was that this requires a salto mortale for human reason. 
However, Fabro interprets Kierkegaard’s response as indicating that the “act of faith is 
a ‘leap’ that faith alone can make, thanks to the ‘choice’ of freedom.”25 In other words, 
the “leap” is not conceptual but existential. Fabro explains Kierkegaard’s position in 
this way:
It is by the paradox as such that the believer is brought to believe and not by logical evidence. 
If he were not convinced of the absolute transcendence of the object of faith and of the break 
with the sphere of reason that this involves, he would not believe but rather he would begin 
to search for some kind of evidence in the sphere of reason, or at least for some kind of 
probability, some likelihood, etc. Hence one can say that one believes precisely because the 
object of belief manifests itself as paradox, as absurd, as contrary to reason.26
By portraying Kierkegaard’s notion of subjectivity in this existential rather than 
exclusively conceptual light, readers that are used to reading Kierkegaard in a non-
ecumenical manner may get worked up by his remark that works are necessary for 
faith. But instead of pushing Kierkegaard closer to Luther’s rejection of the necessity 
of works, Fabro draws upon an entry from 1849 in Kierkegaard’s Journals to appreci-
ate the constructive dialectic of subjectivity at work in Kierkegaard’s theology of faith. 
Kierkegaard says that normally in matters of faith, objectivity is often emphasized in 
order to ward off any possibility of the efficaciousness of merit. Kierkegaard says that 
“to constrain subjectivity, we are quite properly taught that no one is saved by works, 
but by grace—and corresponding to that—by faith.”
But then, Kierkegaard asks, does this mean that subjectivity has no role to play in 
conversion? Either we must remove subjectivity from the process of salvation alto-
gether and we are left with a “fatalistic election by grace,” or “we must make a little 
concession” for subjectivity. For Kierkegaard, the problem is that either way, “subjec-
tivity is always under suspicion” because even “when it is established that we are 
saved by faith” we are still inclined to worry that “too much has already been con-
ceded.” But the irony that Kierkegaard uncovers in this perspective is that “no one can 
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give himself faith; it is a gift of God that I must pray for.” So then we must say that 
praying, or praying for faith is also a gift from God that no one can give to himself. 
However, for Kierkegaard there must be “one point or another where there is a halt at 
subjectivity” if one wants to avoid substituting a religious fatalism for grace, by intro-
ducing a regress of subjectivity that turns faith into a dead decision.27
Fabro also draws attention to a passage in this same period in Kierkegaard’s 
Journals where he discusses the societal impact of Luther’s doctrine of faith at length. 
For Kierkegaard, Luther was someone that brought about a more mature view of 
faith—one that fully recognized the impossibility of Pelagianism. Moreover, 
Kierkegaard argues that in his more positive moments, Luther’s view of faith rightly 
emphasized the sheer gift of salvation. However, Kierkegaard is fully aware of the 
pitfalls that Luther’s position opens up for the picture of salvation in Kierkegaard’s 
own society. In 1849, Kierkegaard writes,
The error in the religiousness of our time is that people have made faith into inwardness to 
such a degree that it has actually disappeared; that life is given permission … to behave in 
sheer worldly fashion, and that an assurance about faith has been substituted for faith.28
In this passage, Kierkegaard argues that fetishizing objectivity in the form of an 
assurance of faith is often a way to substitute that assurance for faith itself, which still 
involves human subjectivity, but in a negative way. By citing this passage in his article, 
Fabro highlights Kierkegaard’s insistence upon works of love for genuine subjectivity 
since “faith by itself, if it has no works, is dead” (Jas 2:17, NRSV throughout). For 
Luther, good works come from faith; but for Kierkegaard, works is something that we 
begin with and faith has an object that we are striving to aim at. On Fabro’s reading, 
Kierkegaard does not resist the Catholic doctrine of merit in his theology of faith, and 
his emphasis upon “works of love” belongs “to the most genuine Christian and Thomist 
spirituality.”29 The linking of subjectivity and works in the act of faith is for Fabro 
what is precisely at issue in Kierkegaard’s theology, and this is what Fabro also wishes 
to recover for his purposes in his own intellectual context.
However, Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon subjectivity in matters of faith is motivated 
not because he wants to distance himself from Luther—although he does this from 
time to time. Instead, for Fabro, Kierkegaard’s insight into the necessity of human 
subjectivity for faith provides a key into Kierkegaard’s wider theological commit-
ments regarding the existential implications of the truth and authority of faith. In the 
next two sections, I will examine how Fabro interprets Kierkegaard’s account of the 
truth and authority of faith in a way that accords with Fabro’s own perspective. Once 
human subjectivity and the works of faith are brought more into view, Fabro circles 
back around to discuss how Kierkegaard speaks of faith as saving truth that is grounded 
in the authority and person of Christ.
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The Truth of Faith
The second aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought that Fabro appreciated was the way 
Kierkegaard emphasized the object of faith as saving truth—or to use a remark by 
Romanus Cessario, “Only the Truth has Grace.”30 In Fabro’s view, Kierkegaard at 
once dialectically reclaims the subjectivity of the act of faith and affirms “the super-
natural character of the act of faith, whose ground and principle are in God alone” yet 
the “‘conviction’ of the believer is not the work of nature but a gift of grace.”31 For 
Fabro, Kierkegaard says that in faith there is a “turning of subjectivity” in such a way 
that inwardness can be shown to be objectivity. In this way, Fabro says that for 
Kierkegaard subjectivity requires “personal effort” and that “it is the necessity of 
works so that faith may really be the living existence of such truth.”32
To support his interpretation, Fabro points to Kierkegaard’s dialectic between what 
he calls “theological faith” and “reasoning reason.” Fabro says that for Kierkegaard, 
the one “who wants to be saved must in faith be elevated above reason.”33 Following 
the logic employed in the letters of John, “Those who believe in the Son of God have 
the testimony in their hearts” (1 John 5:10), Fabro says that for Kierkegaard, “Reasons 
do not establish convictions, but rather convictions establish reasons.”34 Kierkegaard 
articulates his point in this way:
If human scholarship and science refuse to acknowledge that there is something it cannot 
understand, or, more accurately, something which it can clearly understand that it does not 
understand, then everything is confused. It is specifically the task of human knowing to 
understand that there is something that it cannot understand and to understand what that is.35
Fabro observes that by endorsing this position, Kierkegaard is not alone in the 
Christian tradition.36 In fact, by illuminating the broader catholicity of Kierkegaard’s 
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39. Fabro cites this passage from Kierkegaard’s Journals in support of his view: “As with the 
individual human being, so does the entire race need repetitions, or tutors who recapitulate 
the lesson, in order to preserve continuity. Geniuses are recapitulators of this sort. They are 
developed much more slowly than other people; they actually run through the basic forms 
of existence that world history has undergone. It is precisely here that their significance as 
correctives is to be found. Although geniuses prophetically display what is to come, they 
do so precisely by means of a more profound memory of what has been gone through. All 
development is indeed not a retreat, but a going-back, and this is primitivity. The earnest-
ness of youth is immediately to begin bona fide to want to resemble the ideal. The earnest-
ness of the older person is to situate faith in between, as the expression of respect for the 
qualitative difference between all his striving and the ideal. Modernity is humbug, assisted 
by the transformation of faith into fictitious inwardness” (X2 A 207 / NB 14: 41).
theological position, Fabro can situate Kierkegaard in the wider Christian tradition, 
offering an alternative to irrationalist readings of Kierkegaard. For Fabro, Kierkegaard 
is alive to the way in which philosophies of immanence have reduced faith to some-
thing within the horizon of conceptual thinking, or reflection. Instead, Fabro portrays 
Kierkegaard in terms of an apologist for “the absolute transcendence of Christianity 
against the invasion of an Enlightenment and Idealist understanding of reason,” which 
is deployed by right-wing Hegelians.37 The consequence is that faith no longer moves 
the world from outside this conceptual world since reflection is retrospective; thus 
faith must be seen as absurd from the perspective of reflection. This is why Kierkegaard 
speaks of faith not as something to move beyond, as one could think beyond immedi-
acy to reflection; rather it is a disengaged and disembodied form of reflection that we 
are meant to move beyond if faith is to be found.
For Kierkegaard, faith operates in the realm of personal conviction in concrete situ-
ations that have a bearing upon the course of one’s life. From the perspective of the 
armchair, faith pertains to the objective uncertainty of the absurd and can be distin-
guished from the personal conviction of a lifestyle choice. But for Fabro, Kierkegaard 
conducts his argument about faith “on a rigorously metaphysical level, faithful to the 
Thomist principle of the specification of acts by means of objects.”38 Just as one does 
not see the horizon until one shifts one’s focus away from everything within that hori-
zon, so faith emerges as the light by which one sees—or using Kierkegaard’s turn of 
phrase, “the point outside the world” that is able to move the whole world. Kierkegaard’s 
positive view of the role of human subjectivity for the truth of faith is a kind of res-
sourcement of true subjectivity that fosters humble striving—what Kierkegaard else-
where calls “existing before God.”39
Importantly, Kierkegaard does not reserve the truth of faith for only the intellectual 
elite, but famously distinguishes between the genius and the apostle in order to 
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highlight not just a conceptual truth that faith seeks to understand, but also to indicate 
the authority to which faith responds.40 I have discussed the way Fabro highlights the 
role of human subjectivity in Kierkegaard’s theology of faith as saving truth. In the 
next section, I would like to consider the way in which Fabro highlights Kierkegaard’s 
emphasis on Christ’s authority in his theology of faith. In this way, we can get a better 
picture of how Fabro is impacted by Kierkegaard for his own intellectual 
development.
The Authority of Faith
The third aspect of Kierkegaard’s thought that Fabro appreciates is that the existential 
situation and truth of faith is grounded in Christ’s authority. It is well known that 
Kierkegaard deploys pseudonyms or fictive authors in his writings. Indeed, one of 
Kierkegaard’s books is entitled Without Authority, which reflects his literary strategy 
of self-abnegation that actively disavows the authority of his own authorial status. Yet, 
Kierkegaard’s stance toward “authority” is informed by the words of Jesus to his dis-
ciples about true greatness: “The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them; and those in 
authority over them are called benefactors. But not so with you; rather the greatest 
among you must become like the youngest, and the leader like one who serves” (Luke 
22:25–26). For example, in Two Ages Kierkegaard’s scriptural position can be detected 
in his exposition of societal “leveling”:
Servants of leveling are the servants of the power of evil, for leveling itself is not of God, and 
every good man will have times when he could weep over its hopelessness, but God permits 
it and wants to cooperate with individuals, that is, with each one individually, and draw the 
highest out of it. The unrecognizables recognize the servants of leveling but dare not use 
power or authority against them, for then there would be a regression, because it would be 
instantly obvious to a third party that the unrecognizable one was an authority, and then the 
third party would be hindered from attaining the highest. Only through a suffering act will 
the unrecognizable one dare contribute to leveling and by the same suffering act will pass 
judgment on the instrument. He does not dare to defeat leveling outright—he would be 
dismissed for that, since it would be acting with authority—but in suffering he will defeat it 
and thereby experience in turn the law of his existence, which is not to rule, to guide, to lead, 
but in suffering to serve, to help indirectly. Those who have not made the leap will interpret 
the suffering act of the unrecognizable one as his defeat, and those who have made the leap 
will have a vague idea that it was his victory.41
Kierkegaard continues his scriptural reflection on “authority” in Book on Adler 
where he praises the patience and attunement of the Virgin Mary toward divine revela-
tion. Kierkegaard characterizes this stance towards authority in light of how Mary 
“treasured all these words and pondered them in her heart” (Luke 2:19). Paul J. 
Griffiths has written an outstanding essay on this aspect of Kierkegaard’s emphasis 
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upon divine revelation as an authoritatively given call that is inwardly realized through 
a response which does not first require deliberation.42 Hence, Fabro can describe 
Kierkegaard as endorsing the view that “faith refers to the authority of the one who 
speaks, so it is established on the person, and faith is a relation of one person to another 
rather than the theoretical evidence of a demonstration.”43 In his article, Fabro does not 
illuminate this point through an exposition of Book on Adler but rather turns to 
Kierkegaard’s unpublished response to Theophilus Nicolaus (a pen name used by the 
Icelandic theologian Magnus Eiriksson), a rationalist who objected to Kierkegaard’s 
portrayal of faith and the absurd in Fear and Trembling (1843).44
For Kierkegaard, the connection between faith and authority is reflected in the dif-
ference between a genius and apostle—that is, between a natural yet extraordinary 
intellectual endowment and divine authority.45 The apostle is an apostle not because he 
is a genius but because of his relation to Christ. One important difference between a 
genius and an apostle is that the apostle does and says what Christ has instructed him 
to do and say. A genius may dedicate their entire life to becoming an expert or solving 
a very important problem, but this is not what an apostle does. The apostle is sent on 
the authority of Christ to announce the good news of the Lord’s life, death, and resur-
rection. The difference is that when the time comes, the genius and apostle defend 
their life’s work for different reasons; and the apostle is prepared to safeguard the truth 
of faith with his own life.
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Now, Fabro construes Kierkegaard’s recovery of the Christian faith in modernity 
not merely as a form of speculation about a doctrine, but rather as an emphasis upon 
self-abnegation before a trustworthy authority and person. On one hand, Christ is the 
person to whom faith is directed and the object of faith itself; on the other hand, in 
order to step out in theological faith, Fabro says that “all the points of support from 
finitude” and “the predominance of reasoning reason” must be renounced or subordi-
nated “to the authority of the One in whom is believed.”46 So for Kierkegaard, a para-
doxical element arises in Christian discipleship when the contemporary follower of 
Christ is led to imitate Christ unto death, renouncing their own life in martyrdom.
Fabro takes this opportunity to illustrate how Kierkegaard’s position contrasts with 
Luther’s—who viewed authority only in terms of the words of Scripture that were 
detached from the person uttering them. Fabro points to a Journal entry from 1850 
where Kierkegaard says that the scandal of the Christian faith is related dialectically to 
the person and authority of Christ.47 In other words, those who are scandalized by the 
Christian faith indicate that they are not under the authority of Christ (1 Cor 1:23). But 
what is the nature of this offence? Fabro says that for Kierkegaard, “it belongs to the 
essence of Christianity that reason cannot provide for itself the intrinsic ground of 
revealed truth.”48 In saying this, one might think that Fabro portrays Kierkegaard as 
denying the possibility of apologetics, but this is not Fabro’s interpretation. Instead, 
Fabro notes that Kierkegaard’s position actually resists the claim that faith rests solely 
upon a speculative science, but instead grounds faith in the authority of Jesus.49 In his 
own words, Kierkegaard says, “The divine paradox is that [Christ] is noticed if in no 
other way than by being crucified, that he performs miracles, etc., which means that he 
is still recognizable by his divine authority even if it requires faith to solve the para-
dox.”50 For Fabro, this is another instance where Kierkegaard’s view of faith is insepa-
rable from the divine authority of Christ. However, this is not the only place where 
authority is at issue for Kierkegaard. One year before his death, Kierkegaard writes in 
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a Journal entry from 1854 about the place of authority in Christianity. Kierkegaard 
cites Augustine as the one who helped him better appreciate the hypostatic paradox of 
Christ’s divine authority.51
This is the way that Christianity came into the world: it was substantiated by authority, its 
divine authority; consequently, the authority is higher. Now for a long time the relationship 
has been reversed: men seek on rational grounds to demonstrate, to substantiate the authority. 
And yet this is supposed to be the same religion. This is the way it was when Christianity 
came into the world: for a long time, humankind had despaired of making anything out of 
this existence (Tilvaereslse), despaired of finding the truth—then came Christianity with 
divine authority. Augustine, for example, always turns the whole matter in such a way that 
the perfection in Christianity is precisely the authority, that Christianity has truth in its most 
perfect form, the authority, that if one could have the same truth without authority it would 
be less perfect, for it is precisely the authority which is the perfection.52
By citing passages like these from Kierkegaard’s Journals, Fabro astutely provides 
an interpretation that suggests Kierkegaard’s apologetics is still carried out on the 
basis of revelation and divine authority—a common argumentative strategy in pre-
conciliar fundamental theology. We must remember that Fabro is writing before 
Vatican II and places Kierkegaard in the preconcilar tradition which claims, “we 
believe to be true what He has revealed, not because we perceive its intrinsic truth by 
the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself, who makes the 
revelation and can neither deceive nor be deceived.”53
Some readers of Kierkegaard might raise objections with Fabro’s interpretation 
here on the grounds that Kierkegaard is more of a dialectical thinker, which would put 
him at odds with magisterial teaching. However, Fabro does not bleach out 
Kierkegaard’s dialectic to place him within this interpretive tradition. In fact, Fabro 
points to Kierkegaard’s own words in a Journal entry from 1844 where he says:
When one says that faith relies on authority and thus thinks that the dialectical has been 
excluded, this isn’t so; for the dialectical begins with asking how it is that one submits to this 
authority, whether or not one can understand for oneself why one has chosen it, whether it is 
a contingency; for in that case, the authority is not authority, not even for the believer when 
he himself is aware that it is a contingency.54
For both Fabro and Kierkegaard, believing the apostolic witness integrates the truth 
of faith with revealed authority. Although this provides an intelligible position regard-
ing the relation of faith and reason, it does not make the invitation to faith any less 
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dialectical. So the implication of Kierkegaard’s distinction here for Fabro is that “the 
work of reason then is not excluded from the object of faith as such, certainly not to 
explain it, but to prepare and invite the person in some way to accept it.”55 In short, 
after highlighting Kierkegaard’s view of the truth and authority of faith, Fabro empha-
sizes Kierkegaard’s dialectical relationship between faith and reason.
The Dialectical Relation of Faith and Reason
Now that Fabro has gathered together Kierkegaard’s emphasis on human subjectivity 
along with his emphasis on the truth and authority of faith, Fabro argues that 
Kierkegaard puts reason and faith into a dialectical relationship. During the twentieth 
century, Kierkegaard was often mistakenly interpreted as advocating a form of irra-
tionalism. Yet by reading Kierkegaard’s Journals, Fabro became dissatisfied with this 
caricature. The contribution that Fabro offered at the time was to put forward an 
account of the dialectical relation of faith and reason, and to do so in a way that placed 
Kierkegaard in the wider Catholic tradition. For instance, Fabro notes how 
Kierkegaard’s view is expressed in an 1848 journal entry where he reflects on Christ’s 
remark, “Unless you see signs and wonders you will not believe” (John 4:48) as an 
indication that faith must have its own proper dimension if an invitation is to be intel-
ligibly accepted.
Quasi-faith thinks it believes—but it cannot swallow miracles and the like; it believes, as 
it is said, in God and Christ but questions miracles. But Christ reverses the relationship: 
first comes the faith which believes miracles, believes because it sees miracles, and then 
next, the faith which believes although no miracles happen. These two qualifications are 
the qualifications of faith, and the marks of offense and the absurd are there. First of all, 
to believe that God will permit something to happen which completely cuts across the 
grain of our reason and understanding—this is absurd. And when one has believed this, 
that it will occur, then to believe even though it does not occur. But if one takes away the 
first qualification of faith—believing because one sees signs and wonders—the spheres 
are confused, for then knowledge and the highest form of faith come to resemble one 
another. For knowledge, when it gains permission to call itself faith, requires no miracle; 
it would rather be free from miracles, simply because miracles are an offense. But the 
highest form of faith is indeed to believe without seeing signs and miracles. Here we see 
an example of how everything is confused if we do not take care to make faith a sphere 
by itself.56
Fabro relates Kierkegaard’s position here to that of Thomas, who said that “nothing 
can be known and believed at the same time.”57 Like Thomas, Fabro argues that 
Kierkegaard also distinguishes between faith and reason, but not in a mutually 
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exclusive manner such that reason is unable to recognize the transcendence of faith 
“through a certain knowledge of cause.”58 In his own words, Kierkegaard says:
Speculation can present the problems, can know that every single problem is a problem that 
exists for faith, is characterized and compounded in such a way that it exists [as a problem] 
for faith—and then ask: Will you believe or not[?] Furthermore, speculation can audit 
faith—i.e., that which at a given moment is believed or is the content of faith—in order to 
see whether faith contains an admixture of nonsensical categories that are not the objects of 
faith but, e.g., of speculation. All this is a very complicated task. Speculation sees—but only 
to the extent that it says: Here it is. Then it is blind. Then comes the faith that believes; it is 
the one who sees in relation to the object of faith.59
Kierkegaard continues to contrast blindness and sight throughout his Journals, 
especially regarding dialectical relation between faith and reason. This subtlety is not 
lost on Fabro and he uses this contrast in fruitful ways regarding Kierkegaard’s notion 
of “the absurd.” This is why Kierkegaard speaks of the absurd in his Journals as a 
“negative criterion” of our relation to God that illuminates the convex side of faith.60
Importantly, Kierkegaard says later that the absurd is seen as absurd from the third-
person perspective which does not inhabit the “I–You” relation of faith.61 Kierkegaard 
illustrates this with an analogy between faith and love:
Take an analogy: Love makes one blind. Yes, but it is nevertheless a cursed thing to become 
blind—well, then, you can just diminish the blindness a little so that one does not become 
entirely blind. But take care—for when you diminish the blindness, you also diminish the 
love, because true love makes one entirely blind. And true faith breathes healthfully and 
blessedly in the absurd. The weaker faith must peer and speculate, just like the weaker love, 
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Not only does Fabro detect an affinity to a remark by Thomas about faith being 
more than an opinion and less than scientific knowledge,63 but Fabro situates this 
affinity in a shared indebtedness to Hugh of St. Victor—the second Augustine. Fabro 
also notices how this shift in Kierkegaard’s later writings moves him toward recogniz-
ing a more positive role for a theological speculation subordinated to faith. Fabro dates 
this later development in Kierkegaard’s thought to around 1850 when Kierkegaard 
read Adolph Helfferich’s two-volume anthology on Christian mysticism,64 which con-
tained, among other things, a large section about Hugh of St. Victor’s view of the posi-
tive relation of faith and reason. The influence of this volume is evident in a Journal 
entry from 1850 where Kierkegaard explicitly cites a passage from Hugh of St. Victor 
that he discovered in Helfferich’s anthology:65
Faith is aided by reason and reason is perfected by faith, since the things are believed are 
according to reason. If reason does not comprehend the truth of these things, it does not 
contradict faith in them. In things which are above reason, faith is not aided by any reason; 
since reason does not grasp what faith believes, and yet there is something by which reason 
is admonished to respect the faith which it does not comprehend. What was said, therefore, 
and was according to reason, was probable to reason, and it freely gave assent to them. But 
what was above reason was made known by divine revelation, and reason did not operate in 
these, but yet it was restrained lest it contend against them.66
It would seem that Kierkegaard’s emphasis upon “the absurd” would place him 
farther away from Thomas, but Fabro is able to point to similar passages in the writ-
ings of Thomas.67 Moreover, Fabro interprets Kierkegaard’s remarks about “the 
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are virtues in a restricted sense, but not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the 
last end in some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last end simply. Hence 
a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi cvi.] on the words, ‘All that is not of 
faith is sin’ (Rom 14:23), says: ‘He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue, 
even if his conduct be good,’” ST 2-1, q. 65, a. 2. For more, see Robert Sokolowski, The 
God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian Theology (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America, 1995), chap. 7.
71. Fabro traces Heidegger’s critique of Scholasticism back to a misrepresentation of Carl 
Braig’s (1852–1923) work, who was a representative of the Tübingen school and from 
whom Heidegger took a theology course at the University of Fribourg in 1911. For 
more, see Fabro, Introduzione a San Tommaso, 280–81. See also Martin Heidegger, 
absurd” in the direction of Hugh of St. Victor. Fabro says that the reason Kierkegaard 
preferred Hugh’s presentation of faith was because “it hit at the heart” of Hegel’s phi-
losophy of religion and Enlightenment rationalism more generally.68 Fabro concludes 
that in his critique of right-wing Hegelianism, Kierkegaard
draws near to Catholic ideas about the function of traditional theology, whose munus is 
certainly not that of demonstrating dogma, but of establishing that it is revealed truth from 
God and of rejecting the attacks of heresy and unbelief as non probantes.69
In passing, Fabro also notes how in Sickness unto Death (1850), Kierkegaard distin-
guishes the difference between ignorance and sin to illuminate the limits of the ethical, 
using Paul’s claim that “whatever does not proceed from faith is sin” (Rom 14:23). It 
is interesting how this coheres with the role of theological virtues in Thomas, who also 
relies upon this same passage from Scripture when he distinguishes between infused 
and acquired virtues, and expands habitus to include both potency and act.70
In his Introduction to St. Thomas Aquinas, Fabro argues that despite the false turns 
of neo-Scholasticism and neo-Thomism that remain susceptible to Heidegger’s criti-
cisms,71 it would be more fruitful “to conduct a comparative study regarding the 
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Philosophical and Political Writings, German Library (New York: Continuum, 2003), 
70–71. In passing, Fabro also notes Heidegger’s bemusement with Braig’s simultaneous 
critique of modern philosophy and Neo-Scholasticism, but Braig’s general pattern of argu-
ment is one that Fabro himself seems to adopt. In his Introduction to St. Thomas, Fabro 
connects the errors of neo-Scholasticism with those of modern philosophy and presents 
the recovery of Aquinas (endorsed by magisterial documents) as the solution to this fail-
ure which also provides a new project for philosophers and theologians after the Second 
Vatican Council. For more on the relation between Carl Braig and Martin Heidegger, see 
John D. Caputo, Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics (New 
York: Fordham University, 1982), 45ff.; S. J. McGrath, The Early Heidegger & Medieval 
Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken (Washington, DC: Catholic University 
of America, 2006), 29–34; Judith Wolfe, Heidegger’s Eschatology: Theological Horizons 
in Martin Heidegger’s Early Work, Oxford Theology & Religion Monographs (Oxford: 
Oxford University, 2013), 25–38.
72. Fabro, Introduzione a San Tommaso, 260–61. Translation mine. See also Cornelio Fabro, 
“Intorno Al Nozione Tomista Di Contingenza,” Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 30, no. 
2 (1938): 132–49. For more, see Joshua Furnal, “Doing Theology with Cornelio Fabro: 
Kierkegaard, Mary, and the Church,” The Heythrop Journal 56 (2015): 931–47, https://doi.
org/10.1111/heyj.12215.
73. ST 2-2, q. 6, a. 2.
74. Fabro, Introduzione a San Tommaso, 299. Translation mine.
theology of faith in both Thomism and in the founder of existentialism, Søren 
Kierkegaard, since he remains faithful to the principles of Aristotelian realism and 
Christian revelation.”72 Fabro goes on to explain and it is worth quoting at length:
The spark of freedom that Thomas demands first and foremost in the theological sphere 
begins with the act of faith, which for him is and must be an absolutely free act, since its 
object is absolute and immutable. Precisely because God is the perfect and immutable 
Principle, and since all of His attributes are immutable and perfect, and precisely because the 
Incarnation of Christ is the absolute Fact of salvation (because of these two supreme 
guarantees in the metaphysical order and in the flux of history), the decision is mine because 
in it, I directly communicate with God and with Christ. Thus for Thomas, faith is also a 
dialectical encounter between intellect and will, where primacy belongs to the will: “To 
believe is immediately an act of the intellect as it is prompted by the will.”73 The object to 
believe in—the Trinity, Incarnation, sin, etc.—certainly transcends the intelligence which 
cannot comprehend it, or even if it does realize this fact, it understands that it cannot 
comprehend it: even here Thomas is in full agreement with Kierkegaard’s claim that in the 
act of faith, reason comprehends that it must believe.74
To sum up, Kierkegaard views the relationship between faith and reason not in 
terms of one cancelling out the other, but in positive, dialectical terms that allow rea-
son to believe what is above reason by faith. Kierkegaard uses the term “paradox” to 
refer to the way that faith can generate both offense and belief—but this response does 
not cancel out the way that the individual reasons or accepts knowledge based upon 
testimonial authority. In his own words, Fabro says that for Kierkegaard, faith “in an 
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75. Fabro, “Fede e ragione,” 170. Translation mine.
76. X6 B 114.
77. Fabro, Selected Articles on Metaphysics and Participation, 266.
78. Ibid., 271.
ontological sense is meta-rational, it is the object of faith that truly ‘knows’ the truth 
of its object and it can move reason itself.”75 In his own works, Kierkegaard plays with 
this dialectic using his pseudonyms that, in the case of Johannes Climacus and 
Johannes de Silentio, do not claim to be insiders to faith, but only observers—a point 
that many interpreters of Kierkegaard miss. For this reason, Fabro includes in the final 
part of his essay an extended translation of Kierkegaard’s response to Theophilus 
Nicolaus.76 In short, Fabro is able to trace Kierkegaard’s position about the way faith 
transcends reason back to a strand of the Catholic tradition.
Concluding Observations
The sheer output of Fabro’s scholarship will continue to take many decades and more 
doctoral research to fully appreciate. As I have suggested here, just one of Fabro’s 
articles on Kierkegaard illuminates a whole host of questions that could generate 
future research. In order to conclude, let me sum up what I see as two important fea-
tures of Kierkegaard’s theology of faith for Fabro’s intellectual journey. First, 
Kierkegaard’s theology of faith positively evaluated the role of human subjectivity in 
such a way that the object and ground of faith is not merely anthropological but prop-
erly theological. This point anticipates Fabro’s later critique of Feuerbach and Rahner. 
In his own words, Fabro says that “Kierkegaard proved against G. E. Lessing and 
modern philosophers, the Christian’s act of faith constitutes the decisive proof and the 
surest commitment the human person can have for God.”77 For Fabro, what separates 
Kierkegaard from Marx and atheistic existentialism is Kierkegaard’s insistence upon 
“the act of freedom to choose the Absolute and to base oneself on it.”78
Second, Kierkegaard’s view of the truth and authority of faith is dialectical. For 
Kierkegaard, the absurdity of faith indicates a limit to human reason, but when faith 
existentially bears upon the course of one’s life, the absurd is transformed in the light 
of faith. This point anticipates Fabro’s critique of German idealism and what he refers 
to as “philosophies of immanence.” For Fabro, Kierkegaard is one thinker that resists 
totalitarian philosophies of immanence by emphasizing the existence of the supernatu-
ral act of faith. It would be interesting to trace the ways in which Fabro’s critique of 
immanence anticipates many theological critiques of secularism. Although many of 
the secularization debates in sociology are being heavily revised, there is a resurgence 
in continental philosophy of religion with the thinkers that Fabro groups together in 
his attack on the philosophy of immanence.
In short, Kierkegaard remains crucial to Fabro’s own intellectual development. In a 
time when human subjectivity presented itself as a challenge for neo-Thomism, Fabro 
learned to appreciate Kierkegaard’s dialectical view of subjectivity in his theology of 
faith. By reading Kierkegaard’s Journals, Fabro learned more about the dialectical 
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integration of faith and reason in Kierkegaard, which previous scholarship had 
neglected. Moreover, Fabro learned to appreciate the ways in which Kierkegaard 
departed from Luther’s theology and moved closer to patristic thinkers that were also 
influential for Thomas Aquinas. In this way, rather than being merely a historical 
endeavor, Kierkegaard’s writings helped Fabro to see a way to confront contemporary 
philosophies that had attacked or dismissed the central claims of Christianity. Indeed, 
for contemporary Kierkegaard scholarship today, Fabro’s interpretation of Kierkegaard 
remains relevant because Fabro illuminated the themes of authority, dogma, dialectic, 
and paradox in Kierkegaard’s view of the Christian faith to highlight the broader cath-
olicity of Kierkegaard’s thinking.79
Author biography
Joshua Furnal is Assistant Professor of Systematic Theology at Radboud University in the 
Netherlands. He holds a PhD from Durham University and has been a Visiting Research Fellow 
and Lecturer in the Department of Religion at Dartmouth College and the Katholisch-
Theologische Fakultät at the University of Tübingen. He is the author of Catholic Theology 
after Kierkegaard (Oxford University, 2016). He is also one of the main English translators for 
the Cornelio Fabro Progetto Culturale. Currently, he is working on a project at the intersection 
of existentialism and Thomism during the twentieth century.
